Imagine hiring a remote contractor who meets every deadline, performs flawlessly, and never complains about pay. Now imagine that this "employee" is part of a sophisticated cyber operation, using stolen identities and remote tools to funnel earnings and data to one of the most heavily sanctioned governments in the world.
The scenario above is a real and growing threat in the cybersecurity landscape called laptop farming, and its implications go far beyond fraud. In fact, recent U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) raids have exposed how this tactic could become a powerful enabler for politically motivated cyberattacks and hacktivism.
Laptop farms are networks of physical or virtual machines, often set up in homes or small offices, designed to simulate the digital presence of legitimate users. They can be used for various purposes, from bypassing geo-restrictions to automating online interactions.
In the case exposed by the U.S. DOJ, North Korean IT operatives were using stolen American identities to run an extensive laptop farm operation. They recruited U.S.-based individuals to host physical laptops in their homes. These laptops were then connected to keyboard-video-mouse (KVM) switches, allowing operatives in North Korea and other countries to control them remotely.
This gave foreign agents a way to appear as if they were working from U.S. soil. The fraudulent employees used these setups to apply for and secure freelance jobs at American tech companies. In many cases, they successfully integrated into teams, completed projects, and got paid, sending the money directly back to the North Korean regime. Some even gained access to proprietary systems and sensitive data.
While North Korea’s goal was financial and strategic, the same tactics can easily be adopted by hacktivist groups. These are actors who use hacking to advance ideological or political causes. Laptop farms offer the perfect infrastructure for such groups to operate without raising suspicion.
According to joint investigations by Microsoft and federal agencies, the campaign was led by a state-sponsored group called Jasper Sleet. These operatives used over 80 fraudulently acquired U.S. identities and coaching services to pass video interviews and land jobs. In one case, a fake IT worker secured employment at a major U.S. software firm using stolen documents and deepfake technology. In others, teams of operatives worked on legitimate software projects while funneling funds and intelligence to the North Korean regime.
These same techniques could allow hacktivists to launch disinformation campaigns, crash critical infrastructure through distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, or infiltrate government and corporate networks. Disguised as legitimate workers, remote operatives could gain access to internal systems, monitor sensitive communications, and exfiltrate confidential data.
Because laptop farms make it easy to simulate legitimacy and blend into global workforces, they enable anonymity, scale, and plausible deniability. A well-orchestrated campaign could embed dozens of fake employees across multiple organizations, laying the groundwork for long-term sabotage without setting off alarms.
The North Korean laptop farm operation highlighted several critical weaknesses in how companies vet, monitor, and manage remote workers:
For cybersecurity leaders, this incident is a warning. As remote work becomes standard, the risks of digital impersonation and embedded attackers grow significantly.
To stay ahead of evolving threats like laptop farms, companies must adopt proactive cybersecurity strategies that address both technological and human vulnerabilities.
For organizations looking to build or strengthen their foundational knowledge, our Cloud Security Best Practices for Beginners is a great place to start. It outlines the essential steps for securing cloud-based environments, an area where many of these threats can manifest undetected.